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	"Cambodia's misunderstood crisis" 
	 
	The following is the excerpted text of a speech delivered by former 
	Australian Ambassador to Cambodia Tony Kevin at the Australian Institute of 
	International Affairs in Melbourne on November 16, 1998. 
	 
	We have just seen three and a half months of dangerous political 
	brinkmanship. Many lives were lost. Cambodian civil society was stressed to 
	breaking point and its international standing further damaged. Cambodians 
	were encouraged by opposition leaders to reject the credentials of their 
	first national election and their newly elected parliament, to condemn the 
	leader of the largest vote-winning party as a war criminal, and to try to 
	overthrow their government by street protest. 
	 
	We now finally see a successful negotiation between a Cambodian statesman 
	prepared to compromise with his opponent in the interests of national 
	reconciliation, and a terrorist. There is a question: between the two main 
	protagonists, who is the statesman and who is the terrorist? There are 
	different opinions on that question. 
	 
	But is this the right question to be asking now? Is it helpful to the 
	interests of the Cambodian people, who desperately want peace in their 
	society, to put the issue in such impolite and undiplomatic terms? Probably 
	not. There has been so much political name-calling and demonization over the 
	past few years in Cambodian politics; I don't want to add to it. 
	 
	So should we instead gloss over everything, congratulate everyone involved 
	on their statesmanship, cross our fingers and hope for the best? That is 
	what most governments will be doing. It's also the preferred courteous 
	Cambodian way - until things next go wrong. But we tried that approach in 
	1993 after the UNTAC election. For four years, we tried to keep the rocky 
	Hun Sen-Ranariddh political marriage on course as it fell apart. 
	 
	That suggests to me that this time round more frankness is needed from the 
	outset on the part of both Cambodians and their foreign friends. We need to 
	talk more frankly about why the first coalition failed, and about how 
	Cambodia might avoid a replay of the same experience. After all, the 
	Cambodian political elites have just gone from bitter enmity and the most 
	wounding mutual abuse to a coalition in less than one week. But if this 
	coalition is to have any credibility - to them and to us - and if it is to 
	have any chance of bringing real peace and normality to Cambodia, Cambodian 
	leaders need to articulate to their people how they will resolve the real 
	issues that divided them last time. It's not enough to just say, as 
	Ranariddh has said on his agreement with Hun Sen, that there had been no 
	alternative. In his words: "There was no choice but to find happiness and 
	develop the country". One has to ask, if it was that simple, why could not 
	the same agreement have been reached immediately after the 26 July election 
	when Hun Sen was calling for negotiations? What was all the political 
	brinkmanship of the past three months about? Why was it necessary to 
	discredit the election and every institution of the Cambodian State as 
	fraudulent? Why was it necessary to urge people to rise up against "the 
	Vietnamese puppet Hun Sen regime" in the streets? Why was it necessary for 
	so many people - both demonstrators and ethnic Vietnamese victims of riots 
	fomented by some of the demonstrators - to flee in terror, to be beaten up 
	and in some cases to die? The crisis of Cambodia - though alleviated by this 
	welcome news of a coalition - is far from over. If impunity and 
	non-accountability are again to be the political style of Cambodian elites, 
	it is hard to have a lot of faith in the staying power of this agreement. It 
	could again break down - in days, weeks or months - if it is not given 
	firmer moral under-pinnings. 
	 
	The natural courtesy of Cambodians conceals much from foreigners. But in 
	truth, there has been a brutal quality to Cambodian politics over the past 
	thirty years: all too often, the winner takes all and the loser dies or is 
	exiled. Cambodia now needs consciously to pursue a gentler political style. 
	During my time as ambassador I tried to get beyond superficial impressions 
	and conventional wisdoms. I learned to admire the courage, patience and 
	political savvy of the ordinary Cambodian people; never to be surprised by 
	the unexpected; and never to assume that alliances or enmities in the 
	political elites are permanent - all are built on shifting sands of 
	self-interest and real-politik. Most of all, I learned to distrust 
	foreigners who come in with self-righteous and superficial judgements as to 
	who are the good and the bad guys in Cambodian politics, and what to do to 
	fix it. The first rule of Cambodian politics is: things are usually a lot 
	more complicated than they look. The second rule: it is very rarely a case 
	of good guys versus bad guys - they are usually in shades of gray. (My only 
	exception is the Khmer Rouge, unambiguously and definitely bad guys.) And 
	the third rule: ignorant well-meaning interventions by foreigners usually 
	make matters worse. 
	 
	What I'd like to try to do is to focus on three thematic issues that are 
	crucial in looking at Cambodia's current politics.- Theme one: Cambodian 
	politicians generally do not see their main function as to serve the people. 
	As David Chandler pointed out, the Cambodian verb that describes the ruler's 
	relationship to his subjects is not "to serve", not even "to administer" or 
	"to direct", but "to consume". The ruler "consumes" the people. Too many 
	Cambodian politicians still see their role in those terms. It gives rise to 
	an exploitative manipulative style of politics with no accountability to the 
	people. A lot of the sad things that have happened in Cambodian history over 
	the past 30 years are more explicable - though not condonable - when seen in 
	terms of that value system. 
	 
	And it goes on still. When opposition leaders call on the international 
	community to boycott their country's economy, to stop sending aid, to 
	isolate their country diplomatically and declare its leaders war criminals; 
	when they send ordinary people out to risk their lives in the streets for a 
	hopeless cause that is subsequently negotiated away; they are "consuming" 
	the people they should be serving and protecting. That indigenous Cambodian 
	concept of leadership roles has interacted in a damaging way with the more 
	modern totalitarian maxim that "the end justifies the means". Since 1996, 
	Ranariddh and Sam Rainsy have been urging the world to cut off aid to 
	Cambodia in order to force leadership change through public dissatisfaction 
	and unrest. They have never addressed the issue of the distress and 
	deprivation that was inflicted on the economy and on Cambodian people on the 
	brink of starvation along the way. Similarly, these leaders were comfortable 
	in urging people to risk their lives in the streets for political causes 
	that have now, after three months, been compromised in a political 
	settlement. 
	- Theme number 2: That Cambodian politics since at least 1970 has been 
	characterized by deep divisions within the society of Cambodia no less 
	bitter and fundamental than the divisions between communities we see or have 
	seen within many other societies. The opposition has been successful in 
	obscuring foreigners' understanding that the Cambodian conflict is a similar 
	conflict between communities. Funcinpec and the Rainsy Party, whose access 
	to world media and opinion-forming circles cannot be matched by CPP, have 
	successfully presented the Cambodian conflict as an East European fall of 
	communism scenario, with brave and outgunned democrats heroically resisting 
	a brutal authoritarian communist or post-communist state apparatus ruled by 
	an evil strongman. But that is not really what the conflict is about. It is 
	about two communities of Cambodians separated by a bitter history of three 
	decades and very different views of that history. It has strong class 
	overtones: the consuming resentment felt by some members of a dispossessed 
	formerly privileged class against upstart peasants who took their power and 
	assets away and created a different kind of society. 
	 
	The class-based divide between CPP and the opposition also resonates 
	powerfully with the traditional ethnic-territorial fear and antagonism that 
	many Cambodians feel towards Vietnam; which during the past six centuries 
	occupied so much of what was previously Cambodian land, and culturally 
	overwhelmed the Cambodians living in those regions. The historical event 
	that defines the antagonism between CPP and the opposition parties is 7 
	January 1979, the anniversary of the Vietnamese forces' occupation of Phnom 
	Penh which marked the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge. 
	 
	Each side views this anniversary very differently. CPP sees it as a day of 
	joy, signifying when Cambodia was saved just in time from the auto-genocide 
	of the terrible Khmer Rouge. No other country except Vietnam lifted a finger 
	to help save the hapless Cambodian people from their murderous rulers. The 
	opposition sees it as a day of national shame and mourning - when the hated 
	Vietnamese invaders and their CPP Cambodian puppets occupied Cambodia's 
	capital. It was Hun Sen's attempt in January 1996 to make the day a shared 
	national celebration that helped spark off the breakdown of cooperation 
	between Hun Sen and Ranariddh. Who was most to blame for this breakdown and 
	the war of July 1997 will be debated by historians. The important thing here 
	is the opposed perceptions that firmly exist on each side, that lead to each 
	side de-humanizing the opponents and denying them a legitimate place in 
	Cambodian society. Thus, CPP see Funcinpec as traitors: collaborators with 
	the Khmer Rouge from 1979 to 1991, and again from late 1996 till recently; 
	and totally selfish and indifferent to the plight of the Cambodian people. 
	There is real anger in the CPP rank and file about Funcinpec policies of 
	mobilizing international pressure to starve, intimidate and suppress the 
	rights of Cambodian people to a normal life. When you next read about dead 
	bodies of opposition activists found floating in the Mekong, remember that 
	anger. I say this not to condone such killings, but to be aware of the 
	context in which they took place. 
	 
	Funcinpec sees CPP as traitors; collaborators with and puppets of Vietnam, 
	former Communists who at heart are communists still, expropriators of 
	private property, and brutal suppressors of Cambodian national values and 
	traditions. Each side has become more embittered and entrenched in such 
	extreme views over the past few years since 1996. The gains in national 
	reconciliation, the healing of the wounds and the awakening of a sense of 
	shared Cambodian-ness, that was starting to be seen in the years 1993 to 
	1996, was sacrificed in the ensuing three years. Cynicism and mutual 
	contempt are widespread among the people. It did not have to happen this 
	way. It would not have happened if Cambodian leaders had handled their 
	differences peacefully and in a spirit of mutual respect. 
	 
	Until the surprise agreement toward a coalition, the dynamics were all going 
	downhill. The irresponsible intervention of fanatical American ideologues - 
	the Rohrbacher resolution in the US Congress declaring Hun Sen a Khmer Rouge 
	war criminal - was further poisoning the well of Cambodian politics and 
	Cambodia's international relations. Now after the political compromise I am 
	a little more hopeful. But still the basic challenge remains unsolved - 
	namely, how to acknowledge in your heart the legitimacy of your opponents? 
	How to grant them a legitimate place in the society you co-habit with them? 
	How not to de-humanize them? Cambodia must face up to this dilemma. Until in 
	their hearts each side can overcome the mutual contempt and fear of the 
	other, there will never be real peace in Cambodia - only a succession of 
	tactical armistices punctuated by further fighting. And each bout of 
	fighting will generate new victims. 
	 
	We in Australia like to simplify issues, to translate them into our familiar 
	political categories such as democracy, human rights, freedom to 
	demonstrate, suppression of dissidents. But we won't understand Cambodia, 
	and we won't be helping Cambodians, until we make the effort of imagination 
	and cultural perspective to understand how they see their problems. It's 
	doubly difficult, because in order to make their problems understandable to 
	us and to make us sympathize with their respective viewpoints, Cambodians 
	often present their problems to us in terms of our preferred categories of 
	political thought. And because opposition politicians are so much better 
	than CPP at projecting their cause to foreigners in terms that we can 
	respond to - and Sam Rainsy is a 
	true genius in this area - we tend to see Cambodia through Fun-cinpec eyes. 
	So we all talk about Cambodia's problems in our own language. And we are all 
	misled. 
	- Third theme: the enormous power of foreigners to 
	influence the way the political game is played in Cambodia, and the 
	consequent responsibility on all who presume to play a role in Cambodian 
	politics - or simply to comment on Cambodian politics - to consider very 
	carefully the effects on Cambodian politics of what we say and do. We have 
	an enormous power to influence events in Cambodia for good or ill. Our words 
	are listened to and respected. The way we speak about Cambodian politics 
	influences how Cambodians perceive their own political reality. 
	 
	Since 1991 that influence has not been used as well as it should have been. 
	Our media have too often misrepresented Cambodian political issues and 
	leaders. There has been too much convenient and lazy stereotyping. The 
	stereotypes have become so powerful that it is almost impossible for a 
	Western journalist new on the scene - even one who sets out conscientiously 
	to research the background and write honestly about current events - to 
	escape from them. And such journalism, playing back a constant repetition of 
	these stereotypes into Cambodia, influences how Cambodians with some access 
	to newspapers and radio themselves see their country's present crisis. And 
	that in turn influences the crisis. The way in which the street 
	demonstrations were seen and reported abroad - as an East European-style 
	street democracy movement - fed back into Cambodia and influenced many 
	Cambodians to see their government's position as wrong, and the opposition 
	tactic of obstruction and non-cooperation in forming a new government as 
	right. Many Cambodians are now confused and anxious. They no longer know if 
	they had a fair election or not. They have been misled by simplistic and 
	self-righteous foreign interpretations of their own politics. We foreigners 
	helped to perpetuate the unnecessary crisis of the last three months. 
	 
	Finally, where are we left now after the welcome news of a new Cambodian 
	coalition? It is certainly an improvement on what went before. The King has 
	done a wonderful job in persuading Prince Ranariddh to compromise - cleverly 
	choosing a time when Sam Rainsy was safely distant in Paris. Hun Sen to his 
	credit has pragmatically made substantial political concessions to enable 
	Ranariddh to join the government in a high status position and without loss 
	of face. The concessions are potentially fruitful of peace. But all will now 
	depend on the spirit in which the opposition receives them. 
	 
	I fear based on past experience that the opposition and their foreign 
	advocates may draw the wrong lessons from these compromises, and that they 
	may take into government with them the same kinds of attitudes that made the 
	1993-1997 coalition a failure. If Ranariddh continues to feel that this 
	government is not really his - that he owes no allegiance to it; if he 
	resumes a double game, intriguing with Sam Rainsy in opposition; if he and 
	Sam Rainsy continue to project Hun Sen to the world as the worst kind of 
	villain; if they rationalize this latest agreement the way they rationalized 
	the 1993 government, saying they entered into it under duress and had no 
	real choice - that they really won the 1998 election and it was stolen from 
	them; if Ranariddh tries through the rehabilitated Funcinpec rebel generals 
	and their reintegrated forces in the RCAF again to establish a clandestine 
	counter-government military force; - then the old cycle of mistrust and 
	preventive escalation will recur again. 
	 
	So there is nothing automatic about this latest peace. We cannot afford to 
	be complacent about it. And that's where foreign voices come in. I think 
	that at this juncture it is terribly important for foreigners who care about 
	the Cambodian people to say to Cambodian leaders what we really feel. We 
	should not keep diplomatically silent. The Dana Rohrabachers and Jesse 
	Helmses of this world certainly will not do so. Many journalists and 
	newspaper editorialists will continue out of habit or prejudice to demonise 
	Hun Sen and CPP. It will take courage and perseverance, but for the sake of 
	real peace and national reconciliation in Cambodia, those who think 
	differently from them need to say so, publicly and firmly. We can influence 
	events in Cambodia to the good if we do so. 
	 
	We need to break the destructive stereotype view of Cambodia as being 
	fundamentally a conflict about political human rights. Cambodia's politics 
	does not have to be winner-take-all, kill the losers and their families, and 
	eat their livers! It can be humanized. 
	 
	I know that the vast majority of the Cambodian people want an end, after 30 
	years of internal conflict, to violent and destructive politics. 
	 
	It is up to us now, and to their own leadership elites, to help them to find 
	a new style of politics. 
	
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